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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 14-3472 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RAYMOND PAUL FRANCIS,  
 
        Appellant 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-13-cr-00064-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Terrence F. McVerry 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on April 30, 2015 
 
Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed January 19, 2016) 
 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Raymond Paul Frances1 was convicted of unlawful reentry after deportation in 
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.  On appeal, he argues that (1) the District Court wrongly 
decided that he could not collaterally challenge his deportation and (2) the information 
and evidence are insufficient because the government did not allege or prove the 
existence of a deportation order.  We reject these arguments and will affirm.    
I. Background  
 On March 4, 1993, Frances, a British citizen, entered the United States pursuant to 
the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which permits aliens from designated countries to seek 
admission to the United States for up to 90 days as nonimmigrant visitors without 
obtaining a visa.2  All applicants for the VWP must sign Form I-94W in which they 
waive “any rights to review . . . or to contest, other than on the basis of an application for 
asylum, any action in deportation.”3   
 After Frances’s authorized stay expired, he remained illegally in the United States.  
In 1996, Frances married Bao Chau Huu Lee, a naturalized American citizen, and 
subsequently filed an application for an adjustment of status as the spouse of a United 
States citizen.  While his application was pending, Interpol informed the Maryland State 
Police that Frances was wanted in the United Kingdom for drug-related offenses.  INS 
issued a warrant and deported Frances on August 28, 1997.  Two months later, INS 
informed Frances that his application for adjustment of status was terminated because of 
his deportation.   
                                              
1 The correct spelling of appellant’s name is “Frances,” not “Francis” as in the caption.   
2 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a).   
3 Form I-94W; see 8 U.S.C. § 1187(b)(2).  
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 On February 21, 2013, Frances was discovered in Pennsylvania and charged with 
unlawful reentry.  After a bench trial, the District Court found Frances guilty and 
sentenced him to time served and one year supervised release.  
II. Discussion4 
A. Frances May Not Collaterally Attack His Deportation.  
 To collaterally challenge the deportation underlying a defendant’s removal as an 
attack on an illegal reentry conviction, the defendant must show that (1) he “exhausted 
any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the 
[deportation] order;” (2) “the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued 
improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review;” and (3) “the entry 
of the order was fundamentally unfair.”5  The District Court correctly determined that 
Frances failed to meet these requirements.   
 Frances has not shown that he exhausted administrative remedies because he never 
challenged the removal—whether at the time of deportation or during the more than 
fifteen years between his deportation and when he was found in the United States.  Next, 
Frances has failed to show that he was improperly deprived of judicial review of his 
removal proceeding.  Frances argues that the District Court erred in finding that he 
waived his right to contest his removal proceeding.  We review the finding for plain 
                                              
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s factual findings for clear error and 
exercise plenary review over its interpretation of the law.  United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 
588, 594 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2006). 
5 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).  
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error, as Frances raises this argument for the first time on appeal.6  Because Frances does 
not dispute submitting a completed Form I-94W and has not presented any evidence 
challenging the validity of his waiver, the District Court did not err in concluding that 
Frances waived his right to review.7  The waiver covered removal proceedings during the 
pendency of his application for status adjustment.8  Finally, Frances has not demonstrated 
that his removal proceeding was fundamentally unfair, because he has not pointed to any 
error in the proceeding.9  INS may deport a VWP entrant without providing judicial 
review of the removal proceeding, even if the alien had applied for status adjustment.10  
B. Information and Evidence Are Sufficient.  
 Frances challenges the information and conviction on the ground that the 
government failed to allege and prove the existence of a deportation order.  Under § 
1326(a), the government must charge and prove that an alien: 
(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or 
removed or has departed the United States while an order of 
exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding, and 
thereafter  
                                              
6 Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 293 (3d Cir. 2005). 
7 See Bradley v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 603 F.3d 235, 239 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 
McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 1986)).  
8 Id. at 242.  
9 United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92, 103-106 (3d Cir. 2004).   
10 Bradley, 603 F.3d at 242.   
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(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the 
United States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place 
outside the United States or his application for admission 
from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General has 
expressly consented to such alien’s reapplying for admission; 
or (B) with respect to an alien previously denied admission 
and removed, unless such alien shall establish that he was not 
required to obtain such advance consent under this chapter or 
any prior Act11   
 
 The information states that Frances (1) is an alien who was deported from the 
United States in 1997; (2) knowingly and unlawfully reentered the United States and was 
found in Pennsylvania in 2013; and (3) had not applied for or received permission to 
return.  Moreover, the notice of intent to deport and the warrant of deportation, along 
with the actual deportation, are sufficient to prove that an order of deportation was 
issued.12  The information sufficiently alleges that Frances violated 8 U.S.C. § 1326.13   
 At trial, the parties stipulated that Frances had been deported in 1997, and that 
when he was found in the United States in 2013, he was an alien and without permission 
to reenter.  Thus, reviewing the evidence de novo, we find that it sufficiently supported 
Frances’s conviction.14   
                                              
11 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). 
12 See Vera v. Atty Gen., 672 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir.) vacated on other grounds, 693 F.3d 
416 (3d Cir. 2012) (reasoning that the documents and the agency action had the effect of 
an order).   
13 An information is sufficient if it (1) contains the elements of the offense, (2) 
sufficiently apprises the defendant of the allegations he must be prepared to meet, and (3) 
allows the defendant to plead an acquittal or conviction to prevent future prosecutions for 
the same offense.  United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 595 (3d Cir. 2012). 
14 We review a sufficiency of evidence claim de novo, and examine the totality of the 
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, and interpret the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government as the verdict winner.  United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 
651, 668 (3d Cir. 2012).   
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III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
